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Education

PhD in Economics, New York University (NYU), 2018-2024 (expected)

Thesis Title: *Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed.*

MA in Economics, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (PUC), 2015-2017

Especialidad en Matemática, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 2014-2015

BA in Economics, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo (INTEC), 2010-2013

References

Professor Alfred Galichon
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Professor Quang Vuong
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Professor Daniel Waldinger
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Teaching and Research Fields

Primary fields: Education Economics and Industrial Organization

Secondary fields: Applied Econometrics and Applied Theory

Teaching Experience

Summer, 2023	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, Lead Instructor
Spring, 2023	Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Fall, 2022	Microeconomics II, NYU, TA for Maher Said
Summer, 2022	Microeconomics I, NYU, TA for Debraj Ray
Spring, 2022	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Viplav Saini
Fall, 2021	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Spring, 2021	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Fall, 2020	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Spring, 2020	Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Ennio Stachetti
Fall, 2019	Introduction to Statistics, NYU, TA for Lucius Riccio

Spring, 2018	Introduction to Economics, PUC, Main Lecturer
Fall, 2018	Industrial Organization, PUC, TA for Juan Pablo Montero
Spring, 2018	Real Analysis for Economists, PUC, TA for Jorge Catepillán

Research Experience and Other Employment

2021	NYU, RA for Alfred Galichon
2017-2018	PUC, Adjunct Instructor of Economics
2015-2017	PUC, RA for Nicolás Figueroa and Martín Besfamille
2014-2015	Ministry of Finance Dominican Republic, Public Debt Analyst

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2018–2023	Dean’s Fellowship Program
2018–2023	MacCraken Fellowship
2017	PUC, Economics Excellence Award
2017	PUC Distinguished Thesis Recognition

Research Papers

“Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed.” (Job Market Paper)

In higher education, various assignment rules exist for pairing students with course professors, ranging from simple random assignment approaches to mechanisms that grant students considerable choice. How do these contribute to learning and the efficient use of instruction inputs? This paper develops an econometric framework to estimate student-professor match effects, and uses the framework to evaluate how students' choice over instructors contributes to learning. I extend the literature on teacher value-added by showing how to use sequences of subject-related courses to non-parametrically identify instructor-specific learning production functions when instructors differ in both their grading policies and teaching abilities. The framework accommodates endogenous course selection, course dropout, and discrete scoring, all ubiquitous in higher education. Using post-secondary academic records, I estimate the model and document the existence of substantial student-professor match effects. However, when allowed to choose, students do not always select the instructor from whom they will learn the most; they place as much weight on expected grades. Relative to the current assignment rule, assigning students to the predicted learning-optimal instructor leads to increases in academic achievement and reductions in the course dropout rate.

“Ramsey pricing revisited: Natural monopoly regulation with evaders” (with Martín Besfamille and Nicolás Figueroa)

We consider a model featuring a single-product natural monopoly that faces evaders, namely, individuals who may not pay the price. By exerting a costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. To maximize the total surplus, a regulator sets the price, the level of deterrence effort, and socially costly transfers to ensure the monopoly's participation. We obtain a modified Ramsey formula, which clearly shows the mere existence of evaders dampens the use of the price as an instrument to finance the firm's deficit. In fact, we find sufficient conditions to ensure the regulated price is lower than the marginal cost for any level of the deadweight loss of taxation. Then, we generalize the model to incorporate moral hazard. Finally, we undertake an empirical application of our results, which shows quantitatively that the downward tendency of regulated prices in a context of high evasion is significant.

Other Information

Programming: Python, Stata, Matlab, LaTeX
 Languages: Spanish, English
 Citizenship: United States, Dominican Republic